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ABSTRACT 
  The sentencing regime that governs white-collar criminal cases 
requires reform. The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines recommend 
sentences that are generally too high and place a grossly 
disproportionate emphasis on the concept of “loss”—the dollar value 
of the harm that a court finds a white-collar criminal to have caused. 
This concept of loss is ill defined, and often artificial to the point of 
being arbitrary. Moreover, the loss calculation fails to adequately 
approximate a defendant’s culpability, dwarfing traditionally relevant 
considerations such as the manner in which the defendant committed 
the crime and the defendant’s motive for doing so. 
  Fortunately, the Supreme Court has recently opened the door to 
systemic reform. In Kimbrough v. United States, the Supreme Court 
held that—at least in certain circumstances—a sentencing judge may 
deviate from a Guidelines recommendation based purely on policy 
disagreement with that guideline. This Note argues that sentencing 
judges should adopt an aggressive interpretation of the Supreme 
Court’s Kimbrough opinion and exercise their newly rediscovered 
discretion to deemphasize the loss calculation and restore rationality 
to the sentencing of white-collar criminals. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Richard Adelson is no Bernie Madoff, but the U.S. Sentencing 
Guidelines don’t account for this distinction. 
Bernie Madoff will perhaps be remembered as one of the most 
loathsome white-collar criminals in history. Over the course of twenty 
years,1 Madoff ran a Ponzi scheme that defrauded thousands of 
people of tens of billions of dollars.2 His conduct was brazen. In 
addition to stealing from hedge funds and banks, Madoff targeted 
universities, charitable organizations, and individuals.3 When meeting 
with a worried widow whose husband had invested his life savings 
with Madoff, Madoff put his arms around the widow and assured her 
that her money was safe.4 Her concerns assuaged, the widow doubled 
down, investing both her pension fund and her own retirement 
savings with Madoff’s firm.5 Now, her money is gone and she has been 
forced to sell her home.6 Madoff appears to have been motivated 
purely by greed. He comingled his victim’s investments with his 
personal accounts and used the funds to pay for lavish personal 
expenditures, including a Manhattan apartment, two yachts, and four 
country club memberships.7 
Madoff was evil, but Richard Adelson was merely weak. Adelson 
served as president of Impath, a publicly traded company that 
specialized in the detection and diagnosis of cancer.8 During the 
course of his employment at Impath, Adelson uncovered a 
sophisticated accounting fraud that had been designed by various 
Impath accounting executives to misstate the company’s financial 
results to inflate the value of the company’s stock.9 Rather than 
report the fraud, however, Adelson chose to conceal it and thus 
joined the conspiracy.10 Adelson was a latecomer to the fraud. His 
 
 1. Transcript of Sentencing Hearing at 43, United States v. Madoff, 626 F. Supp. 2d. 420 
(S.D.N.Y. June 17, 2009) (No. 09 Crim. 213 (DC)). 
 2. See id. (observing that estimates of the loss Madoff caused ranged from $13 billion to 
$65 billion). 
 3. See id. at 44 (observing that Madoff’s investors included “individuals, charities, pension 
funds, [and] institutional clients”). 
 4. Id. at 48. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. at 45. 
 8. United States v. Adelson, 441 F. Supp. 2d 506, 507 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
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participation was not based on greed or a desire to benefit by inflating 
the company’s earnings; rather, “as President of the company, he 
feared the effects of exposing what he had belatedly learned was the 
substantial fraud perpetrated by others.”11 
Bernie Madoff and Richard Adelson are different kinds of 
criminals. Considered through the lens of the U.S. Sentencing 
Guidelines, however, Adelson’s and Madoff’s conduct is substantially 
identical. The amount of loss that a white-collar defendant is found to 
have caused largely drives the determination of his recommended 
sentencing range under the Guidelines.12 Because both Adelson and 
Madoff committed high-dollar frauds,13 the lengthy terms 
recommended by the Guidelines effectively consign both to a lifetime 
in prison when sentences for multiple counts are imposed 
consecutively.14 
Despite these flaws, the Guidelines continue to dominate 
sentencing. Although the Supreme Court rendered the Guidelines no 
longer mandatory in United States v. Booker,15 judges still adhere to 
the Guidelines with roughly the same frequency as before the Booker 
decision.16 A “culture of mandated guidelines” continues to permeate 
the federal sentencing regime.17 
Recent developments, however, may provide an opportunity for 
systemic change. In December 2007, the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Kimbrough v. United States18 authorized a deviation from the 
 
 11. Id. at 513. 
 12. See infra Part II.B.1. 
 13. In Adelson’s case, the sentencing court concluded that Adelson intended a loss of 
between $50 million and $100 million. Adelson, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 510. Bernie Madoff was 
found to have caused a loss in the tens of billions. Transcript of Sentencing Hearing, supra note 
1, at 43. 
 14. In Adelson’s case, Judge Rakoff observed at sentencing that the Guidelines yielded an 
offense level calculation of forty-six, which corresponds to a recommendation of life 
imprisonment.  Adelson, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 510–11. Rakoff further observed that a life sentence 
was effectively available in Adelson’s case because Adelson was charged with five separate 
counts and the penalties could effectively be stacked to yield a sentence of eighty-five years in 
prison. Id. Bernie Madoff was sentenced to 150 years in prison. Transcript of Sentencing 
Hearing, supra note 1, at 49. 
 15. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
 16. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FINAL REPORT ON THE IMPACT OF UNITED STATES V. 
BOOKER ON FEDERAL SENTENCING 46 (2006) (“The conformance rate remained stable 
throughout the year that followed Booker.”); see also infra Part II.A.2. 
 17. Ellen S. Podgor, The Challenge of White Collar Sentencing, 97 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 731, 732 (2007). 
 18. Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 558 (2007). 
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Guidelines based primarily on a sentencing judge’s policy 
disagreement with their recommendation.19 The Kimbrough holding 
significantly expands a judge’s discretion in sentencing certain drug 
offenders,20 and may open the door to policy-based discretion in the 
sentencing of white-collar criminal defendants. 
This Note considers the potential ramifications of the Court’s 
Kimbrough holding for the sentencing of white-collar criminal 
defendants. Specifically, this Note argues that the sentencing regime 
in white-collar criminal proceedings is deeply flawed. The Guidelines 
recommend sentences that are generally too severe and place 
disproportionate weight on the loss calculation—the amount of loss 
the court attributes to a defendant. Kimbrough may provide an 
important avenue for reform. Whereas Kimbrough’s immediate 
holding concerned crack cocaine offenses,21 the Court’s reasoning can 
and should be applied to white-collar crime. Such systemic policy-
based discretion would permit sentencing judges to deemphasize the 
loss calculation, and thereby move toward a more just sentencing 
regime in white-collar criminal cases. 
In presenting this argument, this Note will proceed in four Parts. 
Part I will examine the history of the Guidelines, discussing the 
Sentencing Commission’s policy choices at the Guidelines’ inception 
and the development of the Guidelines governing white-collar crime 
over the past two decades. Part II will examine the current status of 
the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, concluding that, post-Booker, the 
Guidelines’ recommendations have remained the most important 
determinant of a defendant’s sentence. Part II will then focus on the 
Guidelines applicable to white-collar crime, concluding that the most 
important factor at sentencing is the loss calculation. Part III will 
make the case that the sentencing regime in white-collar criminal 
cases is in need of reform. It will argue that the Guidelines 
recommend sentences that are generally too high and that the 
 
 19. See infra Part IV.A. 
 20. Prior to the Court’s Kimbrough decision, seven circuit courts of appeal had held that 
sentencing courts could not deviate from the Guidelines’ recommendations based on a 
disagreement with the disparate treatment of crack and powder cocaine. See Kimbrough, 128 S. 
Ct. at 566 n.4 (observing this holding in United States v. Leatch, 482 F.3d 790, 791 (5th Cir. 2007) 
(per curiam), United States v. Johnson, 474 F.3d 515, 522 (8th Cir. 2007), United States v. 
Castillo, 460 F.3d 337, 361 (2d Cir. 2006), United States v. Williams, 456 F.3d 1353, 1369 (11th 
Cir. 2006), United States v. Miller, 450 F.3d 270, 275–76 (7th Cir. 2006), United States v. Eura, 440 
F.3d 625, 633–34 (4th Cir. 2006), and United States v. Pho, 433 F.3d 53, 62–63 (1st Cir. 2006)). 
 21. Id. at 564. 
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Guidelines’ emphasis on the loss calculation distracts from the 
purposes of sentencing. Part IV will discuss the Supreme Court’s 
holding in Kimbrough v. United States. It will conclude that, even 
under a narrow interpretation, Kimbrough can and should apply to 
the sentencing of white-collar criminals, allowing judges to move 
away from the Sentencing Guidelines’ disproportionate emphasis on 
loss. 
I.  THE INCEPTION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE GUIDELINES 
The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines were developed to achieve 
greater uniformity among sentences for federal crimes.22 Although 
most of the guidelines were calibrated according to the typical past 
practice of the sentencing courts before the Guidelines era,23 those 
governing white-collar crimes were designed to produce short but 
definite sentences.24 Since the Guidelines’ inception, however, 
sentences for white-collar crimes have trended dramatically upward,25 
and now bear little relation to their former selves. 
A.  The Guidelines at Their Inception 
1. The Guidelines Generally.  The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines 
were developed to remedy the prevalence of unwarranted sentencing 
disparity.26 Before the Guidelines, sentences for substantially similar 
federal crimes varied across regional, racial, and gender lines.27 To 
address this concern, Congress passed the Comprehensive Crime 
 
 22. Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises upon 
Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 4–5 (1988). 
 23. Id. at 17. 
 24. Id. at 20–21. 
 25. See infra Part I.B. 
 26. Breyer, supra note 22, at 4–5. 
 27. For example, defendants convicted in the South were likely to serve a sentence six 
months longer than the national average, whereas defendants convicted in central California 
would likely serve a sentence twelve months shorter. Breyer, supra note 22, at 5 (citing 
Sentencing Guidelines: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the H. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 676 (1987) (statement of Ilene H. Nagel, Comm’r, U.S. Sentencing 
Commission)). Female bank robbers were likely to serve six months fewer than similarly 
situated male bank robbers. Id. at 5 (citing Sentencing Guidelines, supra, at 676). Black 
defendants faired more poorly in the South than they did in other regions of the country. Id. 
(citing Sentencing Guidelines, supra, at 676–77). Sentences even varied widely between different 
judges in the same circuit. One study of judges in the Second Circuit revealed that sentences in 
identical cases could range from three to twenty years in prison, depending on which judge 
presided over sentencing. Id. at 4–5 (citing S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 41 n.22 (1984)). 
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Control Act of 1984,28 which created the U.S. Sentencing Commission 
(Commission)29 and charged it with developing a sentencing policy 
that would achieve greater sentencing uniformity and comport with 
congressionally prescribed purposes of sentencing. The Act codified 
these purposes at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).30 
In 1987, the Commission enacted the first U.S. Sentencing 
Guidelines,31 which emerged as a compromise among the 
Commission’s members.32 The Commissioners divided on the 
purposes of punishment; some wished to emphasize deterrence 
rationales whereas others focused on punishment’s retributive value.33 
Further factions emerged within these camps because neither the 
proponents of retribution nor the proponents of deterrence could 
agree on a sentencing regime that adequately met their respective 
purposes.34 
In response to these problems, the Sentencing Commission 
decided to base the Guidelines primarily on the typical past practice 
of the sentencing courts.35 The Commission ascertained the factors 
that drove sentencing before the Guidelines by analyzing 
approximately 100,000 case histories—10,500 of which probation 
officers examined in detail.36 Based on this data, the Commission 
 
 28. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, 98 Stat. 1837, 
1976–2194 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 28 U.S.C.). 
 29. See id. § 217(a), 98 Stat. at 1976–2026 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 991–98 
(2006)). 
 30. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(A). Section 3553(a), discussed in more detail infra, Part II.A.2, is 
a congressional statement of the purposes of sentencing that was enacted as part of the 
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984. The statute states that sentences should be 
sufficient but not greater than necessary to achieve the traditional retributive and deterrent 
aims of the criminal justice system. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) (describing the need for a 
sentence to “reflect the seriousness of the offense,” provide “just punishment,” and “afford 
adequate deterrence to criminal conduct”). 
 31. See Breyer, supra note 22, at 1 (“Since November 1987, the new Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines have been law.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 32. Id. at 17. 
 33. See id. at 15–16 (“[S]ome students of the criminal justice system strenuously urged the 
Commission to follow what they call a ‘just deserts’ approach to punishment. . . . An alternative 
school of thought recommended that the Guidelines be based on models of deterrence.”). 
 34. See id. at 17 (observing that the Commission was “[f]aced, on the one hand, with those 
who advocated ‘just deserts’ but could not produce a convincing, objective way to rank criminal 
behavior in detail, and, on the other hand, with those who advocated ‘deterrence’ but had no 
convincing empirical data linking detailed and small variations in punishment to prevention of 
crime”). 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 18. 
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identified the factors that mattered in pre-Guidelines sentencing and 
calibrated the Guidelines so that the presence or absence of those 
factors would yield the same sentence as it would have in the typical 
case before the Guidelines were enacted.37 In this manner, the 
Commission was able to achieve greater uniformity in sentencing 
without confronting the deep-seated philosophical tensions that 
underlie the criminal justice system.38 
2. The Guidelines Governing White-Collar Crime.  The 
Commission explicitly rejected the typical past practice of sentencing 
courts in the case of white-collar crime.39 In its analysis of the pre-
Guidelines sentencing regime, the Commission observed 
discrepancies between the punishment of white-collar crimes and 
their blue-collar analogues.40 Simple theft was punished more harshly 
than fraud, for example.41 White-collar criminals were also more 
likely to receive probation and, if imprisoned, generally served 
shorter sentences than those who committed common law crimes of 
similar severity.42 The Commission viewed these discrepancies as 
unfair.43 Therefore, rather than codify typical past practice, the 
Commission calibrated the Guidelines to produce a “short but 
definite” period of confinement for white-collar criminals.44 The 
Sentencing Commission believed that this would deter crime better 
than a sentencing regime allowing many white-collar criminals to 
avoid prison time.45 
 
 37. See id. at 17–18 (“The numbers used and the punishments imposed would come fairly 
close to replicating the average pre-Guidelines sentence handed down to particular categories of 
criminals.”). 
 38. See id. at 18 (“[T]he Commission’s ‘past practice’ compromise does not reflect an effort 
simply to reconcile two conflicting philosophical positions. It reflects a lack of adequate, 
detailed deterrence data, and it reflects the irrational results of any effort to apply ‘just deserts’ 
principles to detailed behavior through a group process.”). 
 39. Id. at 20 (noting “the Commission’s decision to increase the severity of punishment for 
white-collar crime”). 
 40. Id. 
 41. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON THE INITIAL SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES AND POLICY STATEMENTS 18 (1987). 
 42. Breyer, supra note 22, at 20. 
 43. Id. at 22. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
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Because the 1987 Guidelines sought “short but definite” 
sentences for white-collar defendants,46 it is not surprising that they 
were very simple. The Guidelines governing fraud, for example, fit on 
a single page.47 Only six specific offense characteristics48 could 
increase a defendant’s sentence: (1) the amount of the loss caused by 
the defendant’s fraud; (2) the degree of planning that the fraud 
entailed; (3) the number of victims involved; (4) whether the 
defendant falsely claimed to be acting on behalf of a charitable, 
religious, or government organization; (5) whether the defendant 
violated a judicial or administrative order; and (6) whether the 
defendant used foreign bank accounts or transactions to conceal his 
fraud.49 Subsequent developments, however, would dramatically 
complicate these Guidelines. 
B.  The Evolution of the Guidelines Governing White-Collar Crime 
The Guidelines governing white-collar crime evolved from a 
concise regime focused on generating “short but definite”50 prison 
sentences to the complicated and severe system of today in three 
phases. 
First, the Commission began to increase the sentences imposed 
for white-collar crimes almost as soon as the Guidelines were 
enacted.51 Between 1987 and 1995, the Commission added numerous 
additional specific offense characteristics to the Guidelines and 
amended the loss tables to subject to greater punishment those who 
caused their victims more than $40,000 in losses.52 
The second major development was the Commission’s adoption 
of the Economic Crime Package amendments to the Guidelines in 
 
 46. Id. (“[T]he Commission believed that a short but definite period of confinement might 
deter future crime more effectively than sentences with no confinement condition.”). 
 47. Frank O. Bowman III, Sentencing High-Loss Corporate Insider Frauds After Booker, 
20 FED. SENT’G REP. 167, 170 (2008). 
 48. The term “specific offense characteristics” describes factual circumstances that, if found 
to be present by the sentencing judge, can increase or decrease a defendant’s sentence. For a 
more detailed discussion, see infra Part II.B. 
 49. Bowman, supra note 47, at 173 n.47. 
 50. Breyer, supra note 22, at 22. 
 51. Frank O. Bowman III, Pour Encourager les Autres? The Curious History and 
Distressing Implications of the Criminal Provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Sentencing 
Guidelines Amendments that Followed, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 373, 387 (2004). 
 52. Id. 
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2001.53 As early as the mid-1990s, the Commission decided that 
comprehensive reform of the white-collar Guidelines was necessary.54 
The Justice Department, the Judicial Conference of the United 
States, and many federal probation officers believed that sentences 
for white-collar defendants convicted of high-loss crimes remained 
too low.55 Others, including the defense bar, believed that the 
Guidelines were too harsh to defendants convicted of low-dollar 
frauds and that judges should be given greater discretion to sentence 
such offenders to probationary terms.56 Collaboration among these 
groups culminated in the 2001 Economic Crime Package amendments 
to the Guidelines.57 These amendments slightly lowered the sentences 
of offenders convicted of low-loss frauds and significantly raised the 
sentences of offenders convicted of high-loss frauds.58 The 
amendments broadened the definition of loss,59 amended the loss 
 
 53. The Economic Crime Package consists of four amendments to the Sentencing 
Guidelines. First, the guidelines governing theft and fraud were consolidated into a single 
guideline.  Compare U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 2B1.1, 2F1.1 (2000) 
[hereinafter 2000 SENTENCING GUIDELINES] (treating theft and fraud separately) with U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N, GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 (2001) [hereinafter 2001 SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES] (presenting a consolidated guideline for economic crimes). Second, the loss table 
was modified to provide for lower sentencing ranges for low-value white-collar crimes and to 
provide higher sentencing ranges for high-value white-collar crimes. Compare 2000 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra, §§ 2B1.1(b)(1), 2F1.1(b)(1), with 2001 SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES, supra, § 2B1.1(b)(1). Third, the Economic Crime Package amendments tweaked 
the definition of loss. Compare 2000 SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra, § 2B1.1 cmt. n.1 (defining 
loss as the “value of the property taken, damaged, or destroyed”), with 2001 SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES, supra, § 2B1.1, cmt. n.2 (defining loss as a “reasonably foreseeable pecuniary harm 
that resulted from the offense”). Finally, the Economic Crime Package amendments tied the 
sentencing for money laundering offenses more closely to the underlying crime through which 
the laundered funds were obtained. Compare 2000 SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra, § 2S1.1 
(making money laundering a level twenty-three offense if convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 
1956(a)(1)(A), (a)(2)(A), or (a)(3)(A), and otherwise a level twenty offense), with 2001 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra, § 2S1.1 (making the base offense level for money laundering 
the base offense level of the underlying offense). For a full account of the history and 
development of the 2001 Economic Crime Package amendments to the Guidelines, see 
generally Frank O. Bowman III, The 2001 Federal Economic Crime Sentencing Reforms: An 
Analysis and Legislative History, 35 IND. L. R. 5 (2001). 
 54. Bowman, supra note 51, at 387. 
 55. Id. at 387–88. 
 56. Id. at 388. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 389. 
 59. In 2001, the definition of loss under the Guidelines changed from “the value of the 
property taken, damaged, or destroyed,” 2000 SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 53, § 2B1.1 
cmt. n.2, to “reasonably foreseeable pecuniary harm that resulted from the offense,” 2001 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 53, § 2B1.1 cmt. n.2. The 2001 definition is generally 
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table,60 and added a special offense characteristic providing for 
offense-level enhancements based on the number of victims.61 
The passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 200262 marked the 
third and most dramatic stage in the evolution of the Guidelines 
governing white-collar crime. Despite the generally positive reception 
of the 2001 Economic Crime Package amendments,63 the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act dramatically raised the stakes of white-collar crime.64 
Congress passed the Act in direct response to a wave of corporate 
scandals that began with the collapse of Enron in December 2001 and 
continued with breakdowns at WorldCom, Tyco, and Global 
Crossing.65 In a speech delivered from Wall Street, President George 
W. Bush framed these scandals as the result of the individual 
defendants’ moral failings66 and called for stricter criminal laws to 
enforce higher ethical standards in American boardrooms.67 The 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, however flawed,68 accomplished this aim. In 
 
understood to be significantly broader than the 2000 definition. See, e.g., Bowman, supra note 
51, at 389 (observing that through the 2001 Economic Crime Package amendments, the 
Commission “redefin[ed] loss in a way that include[d] more kinds of harm in the loss 
calculation”). 
 60. The amendments to the loss table lowered the offense level enhancements for low-loss 
economic crimes, but raised the enhancements for high-loss economic crimes. For example, in 
2000, a $4,000 fraud would have resulted in a one-level enhancement. 2000 SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES, supra note 53, § 2F1.1. In 2001, however, this fraud would merit no loss-related 
offense level enhancement. 2001 SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 53, § 2B1.1. Under the 
2000 Guidelines, a $100 million fraud would yield an offense level enhancement of eighteen, 
2000 SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 53, § 2F1.1, whereas under the 2001 Guidelines such 
a fraud would yield a twenty-six-level enhancement, 2001 SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 
53, § 2B1.1. 
 61. Bowman, supra note 51, at 388–89. 
 62. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered 
sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.). 
 63. See Bowman, supra note 51, at 394–95 (observing that at a Senate Judiciary Committee 
panel on white-collar crime in 2002, “[n]o one argued that penalties for serious economic crimes 
were too low under federal law,” and that the Justice Department was generally satisfied with 
the 2001 Guidelines amendments). 
 64. See White-Collar Crime Penalty Enhancement Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, tit. IX, 
§ 905, 116 Stat. 804, 805–06 (directing the Sentencing Commission to reevaluate the efficacy of 
the Guidelines governing white-collar crime). 
 65. Bowman, supra note 51, at 392. 
 66. Remarks on Corporate Responsibility, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1194, 1195 (July 9, 2002), 
available at www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/docs/potus.doc (“We’ve learned of some business 
leaders obstructing justice, and misleading clients, falsifying records, business executives 
breaching the trust and abusing power.”). 
 67. Id. 
 68. Many commentators have criticized the Sarbanes-Oxley Act for being hastily and 
sloppily drafted. See, e.g., Bowman, supra note 51, at 406 (“[A] number of the specific directives 
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addition to raising the statutory maximum sentences for various 
white-collar crimes,69 the Act prompted the Sentencing Commission 
to increase the sentencing ranges for white-collar crimes.70 
The Commission  amended the Guidelines to increase the base 
offense level71 of offenders convicted of the most common white-
collar crimes from six to seven.72 The Commission also provided for 
an additional two-level increase to a defendant’s offense level for loss 
calculations exceeding $200 million and another two-level increase for 
loss calculations exceeding $400 million.73 Finally, the Commission 
added variables within the Guidelines to account for the number of 
victims the defendant harmed and the defendant’s rank within an 
organization. The Commission included a six-level increase for fraud 
offenses involving more than 250 victims and an additional four-level 
 
[of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act] reflect a striking unfamiliarity with, or indifference to, existing 
federal sentencing law and experience . . . .”); George J. Terwilliger III, Under-Breaded Shrimp 
and Other High Crimes: Addressing the Over-Criminalization of Commercial Regulation, 44 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 1417, 1417 (2007) (“The testimony during this session, convened to give due 
consideration to [the Sarbanes-Oxley bill], was interrupted so that the members could go to the 
Senate floor and vote on the very legislation under consideration.”). 
 69. Peter J. Henning, The Changing Atmospherics of Corporate Crime Sentencing in the 
Post-Sarbanes-Oxley Act Era, 3 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 243, 246 (2008). Changes in the statutory 
maximum are largely superficial, however, as the Guidelines calculations are usually far less 
than these statutory maximums. Id. 
 70. Specifically, the Act directed the Commission to “ensure that the sentencing guidelines 
and policy statements reflect the serious nature of the offenses and the penalties set forth in 
[the] Act, the growing incidence of serious fraud offenses . . . and the need to modify the 
sentencing guidelines and policy statements to deter, prevent, and punish such offenses.” White-
Collar Crime Penalty Enhancement Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, tit. IX, § 905(b)(1), 116 
Stat. 804, 805. Further, the Act directed the Commission to consider “whether the guideline 
offense levels and enhancements for violations of the sections amended by this Act are 
sufficient to deter and punish such offenses, and specifically, are adequate in view of the 
statutory increases in penalties contained in [the] Act.” Id. § 905(b)(2), 116 Stat. at 805. 
 71. The Guidelines’ sentence recommendation is based on a defendant’s “offense level,” 
which is the sum of a defendant’s “base offense level” and any offense level adjustment 
resulting from the defendant’s “specific offense characteristics.” A defendant’s “base offense 
level” is dictated by the crime of which he is convicted. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1 (2009) [hereinafter 2009 SENTENCING GUIDELINES]. 
 72. See Henning, supra note 69, at 248 (“The Sentencing Commission’s first step . . . was to 
increase the base offense level for a fraud offense if the crime was punishable by a term of 
imprisonment of twenty years or more.”). After Sarbanes-Oxley, mail fraud, wire fraud, and 
securities fraud all carry statutory maximum penalties of twenty years. Id. at 246 (citing 18 
U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (2006) and 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (2006)). 
 73. Id. at 248 (citing U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(b)(1) 
(2003)). 
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enhancement for defendants convicted of securities fraud who served 
as officers or directors of a publicly traded company.74 
This history reveals the unique nature of the Guidelines 
governing white-collar crime. Although the majority of the 
Guidelines were calibrated according to the typical past practice of 
sentencing judges, those that governed white-collar crime resulted 
from the Commission’s policy choices and subsequent congressional 
prodding, fueled by a belief that more severe sentences were 
necessary to deter white-collar crime and to achieve justice in white-
collar criminal cases.75 
II.  THE CURRENT SENTENCING REGIME IN WHITE-COLLAR 
CRIMINAL CASES 
Under the current sentencing regime in white-collar cases, the 
key determinant of a white-collar criminal defendant’s sentence is the 
amount of the loss attributed to that defendant.76 The Guidelines 
place incredible emphasis on this so-called loss calculation.77 
Although the Supreme Court’s opinion in United States v. Booker 
rendered the Guidelines advisory, the Guidelines continue to drive 
the sentencing process.78 
Section A of this Part explores the current status of the 
Guidelines. It concludes that despite Booker’s reduction of the 
Guidelines’ formal authority, sentencing judges still follow the 
Guidelines’ recommendations with roughly the same frequency as 
they did before Booker. Section B of this Part explores the Guidelines 
governing white-collar crime, concluding that the single most 
important factor in determining a defendant’s sentence is the amount 
of loss a judge finds the defendant to have caused. 
 
 74. Id. at 248–49 (citing U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, GUIDELINES MANUAL 
§ 2B1.1(b)(14)(A)). 
 75. See Podgor, supra note 17 (observing that legislation increasing the penalty for white-
collar crimes “was an outgrowth of the public outcry for retribution for criminal conduct”). 
 76. See Isaac M. Gradman, Hot Under the White Collar: What the Rollercoaster in 
Sentencing Law from Blakely to Booker Will Mean to Corporate Offenders, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & 
BUS. 731, 744 (2005) (observing that in sentencing white-collar criminals, loss is “often the most 
important determinant of the length of sentence”). 
 77. Id. 
 78. See infra Part II.B. 
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A.  The Sentencing Guidelines’ Continued Impact on the Sentencing 
Process 
1. The Formal Status of the Guidelines.  As a formal matter, the 
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines carry significantly less weight today than 
they did at their inception. The Supreme Court’s decision in Booker 
significantly reduced the formal weight of the Guidelines. In Booker, 
the Supreme Court held that the Guidelines violate the Sixth 
Amendment’s guarantee to a jury trial and struck down the statutory 
provision that made the Guidelines mandatory.79 Subsequent cases 
uphold this shift. In Rita v. United States,80 the Court observed that it 
is now 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a),81 and not the Guidelines, that guides a 
judge’s hand in sentencing.82 Additionally, in Gall v. United States,83 
the Court observed that the Guidelines are only one of many factors a 
district court must consider when imposing a sentence.84 
Section 3553(a) was part of the original Comprehensive Crime 
Control Act that created the Guidelines system85 and sets forth factors 
a court must consider in imposing a sentence. The statute demands 
that courts impose a “sentence sufficient, but not greater than 
necessary”86 to achieve the following aims: (1) reflect the seriousness 
of a defendant’s offense;87 (2) promote respect for the law;88 (3) 
provide just punishment for the offense;89 (4) afford adequate 
deterrence to criminal conduct;90 (5) protect the public from further 
 
 79. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 259 (2005). 
 80. Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456 (2007). 
 81. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006). 
 82. See Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2463 (observing that when assessing a sentence’s reasonableness, 
the dominant inquiry is the degree to which that sentence fulfills the objectives Congress set 
forth in § 3553(a)). But see Robert J. Anello & Jodi Misher Peiken, Evolving Roles in Federal 
Sentencing: The Post-Booker/Fanfan World, FED. CTS. L. REV., Sept. 2005, at para. III.21, 
available at http://fclr.org/fclr/articles/html/2005/fedctslrev9.shtml (stating that Booker “permits” 
courts to consider statutory concerns such as the § 3553(a) factors). 
 83. Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586 (2007). 
 84. Id. at 602. 
 85. See Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, §§ 217–37, 98 
Stat. 1837, 2017–34 (creating the U.S. Sentencing Commission); id. § 212(a)(2), 98 Stat. at 1987–
2010 (codifying the purposes of sentencing). 
 86. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 
 87. Id. § 3553(a)(2)(A). 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. § 3553(a)(2)(B). 
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crimes of the defendant;91 and (6) provide the defendant with needed 
educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional 
treatment in the most effective manner.92 In devising a sentence that 
achieves these aims, courts should consider the circumstances of the 
offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant,93 and the 
kinds of sentences available.94 
In subsequent cases reaffirming and clarifying its Booker 
holding, the Supreme Court has continually emphasized the 
responsibility of a sentencing court to consider the individual factual 
circumstances of every defendant before it.95 In devising a sentence, 
judges are to “make an individualized assessment based on the facts 
presented,”96 and may not presume that a sentence is reasonable 
merely because it falls within the Guidelines range.97 
Despite this reduction in formal authority, the Guidelines remain 
extremely influential at sentencing in that they are the starting point 
of any sentence determination. As the Supreme Court outlined in 
Gall and Rita, a district court begins a sentencing proceeding by 
correctly calculating the applicable Guidelines range.98 Next, both 
parties are afforded an opportunity to argue for the imposition of a 
sentence that they believe to be appropriate under the circumstances, 
which the sentencing judge must consider in light of the § 3553(a) 
factors.99 If a judge ultimately decides to impose a sentence outside 
the Guidelines range, the judge must consider the extent of this 
deviation and ensure that there is a sufficiently compelling 
justification to support the degree of variance.100 A judge must explain 
a sentence that departs from the applicable Guidelines range in order 
 
 91. Id. § 3553(a)(2)(C). 
 92. Id. § 3553(a)(2)(D). 
 93. Id. § 3553(a)(1). 
 94. Id. § 3553(a)(3). 
 95. See, e.g., Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 598 (2007) (“It has been uniform and 
constant . . . for the sentencing judge to consider every convicted person as an individual and 
every case as a unique study . . . .” (quoting Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 113 (1996))). 
 96. Id. at 597. 
 97. Id. at 596–97. 
 98. Id. at 598; Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2465 (2007). 
 99. Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 598. 
 100. Id. This consideration of the degree of variance between the Guidelines sentence and 
the actual sentence imposed, however, cannot take the form of an “exceptional circumstances” 
requirement or a rigid mathematical formula. Id. at 596. Such inflexible approaches, when 
enforced at the appellate level, are inconsistent with the abuse-of-discretion standard of review 
that governs sentencing proceedings. Id. 
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to allow meaningful appellate review and promote the perception of 
fair sentencing.101 
The Guidelines remain influential due to a widely held 
assumption that they reflect a “rough approximation” of sentences 
that comport with the aims Congress set forth in § 3553(a).102 From its 
creation, the Commission has been charged with realizing the 
purposes of sentencing espoused in § 3553(a).103 In Rita, the Supreme 
Court characterized sentencing judges and the Sentencing 
Commission as conducting essentially the same § 3553(a) analysis, 
“the [former], at retail, [and] the other at wholesale.”104 
2. The Guidelines’ Continued Practical Impact.  Evidence of the 
persistent relevance of the Guidelines calculus can be readily 
observed. In its Final Report on the Impact of United States v. Booker 
on Federal Sentencing, the Commission concluded that in 2006, a 
supermajority—85.9 percent—of federal sentences conformed to the 
Guidelines.105 The Commission found that the severity of sentences 
did not substantially change after Booker.106 
This continued adherence to the Guidelines has not changed 
since the Supreme Court clarified its Booker holding through its 
subsequent opinions in Rita, Gall, and Kimbrough. Since the Gall and 
Kimbrough decisions in December 2007,107 the frequency with which 
district courts have imposed sentences within the Guidelines range 
has dropped a mere percentage point, from 60.8 percent to 59.8 
percent.108 Of these non-Guidelines sentences, the vast majority are 
 
 101. Id. at 597. 
 102. See Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2464–65 (“[I]t is fair to assume that the Guidelines, insofar as 
practicable, reflect a rough approximation of sentences that might achieve § 3553(a)’s 
objectives.”). 
 103. Id. at 2463; see also 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(A) (2006) (stating that one of the Sentencing 
Commission’s objectives is to carry out the purposes of sentencing espoused in § 3553(a)). 
 104. Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2463. 
 105. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 41, at 46. 
 106. Id. Although the report provides no breakdown of sentencing practices in white-collar 
criminal cases specifically, commentators have observed that sentencing in white-collar criminal 
cases remains tied to the Guidelines calculations. See, e.g., Podgor, supra note 17, at 732 
(“Although the sentencing guidelines have some flexibility resulting from the recent Supreme 
Court decision in United States v. Booker, the culture of mandated guidelines still permeates the 
structure, and, as such, prominently advises the judiciary.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 107. The Supreme Court decided Rita in February 2007, one term prior to its decisions in 
Gall and Kimbrough. 
 108. NORMAN ABRAMS & SARA SUN BEALE, FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS 
ENFORCEMENT 240 (4th ed. Supp. 2008). 
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attributable to downward departures sought by the government.109 
Since Gall and Kimbrough, the percentage of sentences outside the 
Guidelines range that are not attributable to government-sponsored 
departures increased by only 1.4 points, from 12.0 percent before Gall 
and Kimbrough to 13.4 percent after.110 
This data suggests that although Booker and its progeny 
dramatically changed the formal relationship of the Sentencing 
Guidelines to the sentencing process, as a practical matter the 
Guidelines calculations remain the key determinant of a defendant’s 
sentence.111 
B.  The Loss Calculation’s Dominant Role at the Sentencing of White-
Collar Criminal Defendants 
In the context of white-collar crime, the loss calculation remains 
a “critical determinant” of a defendant’s sentence112 and is often the 
“the single most important factor in the application of the Sentencing 
Guidelines.”113 
1. The Context of the Loss Calculation Within the Guidelines.  
The calculation of a defendant’s sentence under the Guidelines is 
based on that defendant’s offense level.114 For most white-collar 
crimes, this determination begins with a base offense level of either 
six or seven, depending on whether the offense of which the 
 
 109. Id. In the year before the Gall and Kimbrough decisions, 25.6 percent of sentences 
incorporated a government-sponsored departure from the Guidelines range, compared to 12 
percent of sentences that incorporated a variance from the Guidelines range that was not 
sponsored by the government. In the nearly five months following Gall and Kimbrough for 
which data is available, 25.2 percent of sentences were the result of a government-sponsored 
departure, whereas 13.4 percent of sentences incorporated a variance that was not sponsored by 
the government. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Indeed, several commentators have reached this conclusion. See, e.g., id. at 242 (“[This 
data] does not support the fear that the sky would fall after Gall and Kimbrough.”); Podgor, 
supra note 17, at 732 (“Although the sentencing guidelines have some flexibility resulting from 
the recent Supreme Court decision in United States v. Booker, the culture of mandated 
guidelines still permeates the structure, and, as such, prominently advises the judiciary.” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
 112. United States v. Rutkoske, 506 F.3d 170, 179 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 113. See Peter J. Henning, White Collar Crime Sentences After Booker: Was the Sentencing 
of Bernie Ebbers Too Harsh?, 37 MCGEORGE L. REV. 757, 767 (2006) (observing that the loss 
calculation was the most important factor in the sentencing of WorldCom CEO Bernie Ebbers). 
 114. See 2009 SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 71, ch. 5, pt. A (showing a list of 
offense levels and the sentence ranges to which they correspond). 
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defendant was convicted entails a statutory maximum term of 
imprisonment of twenty years or more.115 The sentencing court then 
adds additional levels based on the specific offense characteristics of 
the defendant’s case.116 The loss calculation is the most important of 
these specific offense characteristics.117 
In applying the loss calculation, sentencing courts first must 
determine whether the intended or actual loss is greater.118 If this 
figure is above $5,000, then additions are made to the defendant’s 
offense level in accordance with the table found in Section 
2B1.1(b)(1) of the Guidelines Manual, which is reproduced here:119 
Table 1.  The Loss Calculation 
Loss (Apply the Greatest) Increase in Level 
$5,000 or less No increase 
More than $5,000 Add 2 
More than $10,000 Add 4 
More than $30,000 Add 6 
More than $70,000 Add 8 
More than $120,000 Add 10 
More than $200,000 Add 12 
More than $400,000 Add 14 
More than $1,000,000 Add 16 
More than $2,500,000  Add 18 
More than $7,000,000 Add 20 
More than $20,000,000 Add 22 
More than $50,000,000 Add 24 
More than $100,000,000 Add 26 
More than $200,000,000 Add 28 
More than $400,000,000 Add 30 
As this table from Section 2B1.1(b)(1) indicates, the loss 
calculation can add up to thirty levels to a defendant’s offense level, 
which can account for up to a 262-month increase in the length of a 
defendant’s recommended sentence, even in the absence of any other 
 
 115. Id. § 2B1.1(a). 
 116. Id. § 2B1.1(b). 
 117. See supra note 76. 
 118. See 2009 SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 71, § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3 (“[L]oss is the 
greater of actual loss or intended loss.”). 
 119. Id. § 2B1.1(b)(1). 
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sentence enhancing characteristics.120 The loss calculation alone can 
transform a sentence from “modest to substantial.”121 
2. Calculating Loss.  Despite the importance of the loss 
calculation in determining a defendant’s sentence,122 neither Congress 
nor the Sentencing Commission has offered courts any real guidance 
on how to calculate this figure.123 The commentary to the Guidelines 
defines loss circularly as “the greater of actual loss or intended 
loss.”124 It further defines actual loss as the reasonably foreseeable 
harm that resulted from the offense, when that harm is measurable in 
terms of money.125 The Guidelines commentary defines intended loss 
as the monetary harm that the defendant intended to result from the 
offense.126 The Guidelines further instruct courts that in determining 
these figures, they are to take into account factors such as the “fair 
market value of the property unlawfully taken, copied, or 
destroyed,”127 “[t]he approximate number of victims multiplied by the 
average loss to each victim,”128 and “[t]he reduction that resulted from 
the offense in the value of equity securities or other corporate 
assets.”129 These definitions and factors are unhelpful and circular, 
however, because they assume the definition of loss and ignore 
thorny causation issues inherent in phrases such as “the property 
unlawfully taken, copied, or destroyed” and “the reduction that 
resulted from the offense.”130 
 
 120. See id. ch. 5, pt. A (showing that the Guidelines recommend a sentence of between zero 
and six months for a defendant with no prior criminal history and an offense level of seven, and 
that the Guidelines recommend a sentence of between 210 and 262 months for a defendant with 
no prior criminal history and an offense level of thirty-seven). 
 121. Podgor, supra note 17, at 754 (quoting Henning, supra note 113, at 767). 
 122. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 123. See Samuel W. Buell, Reforming Punishment of Financial Reporting Fraud, 28 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1611, 1628 (2007) (“Congress and the Sentencing Commission have been no 
help to courts faced with the task of determining loss in cases of financial reporting fraud.”). 
 124. 2009 SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 71, § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. In most cases involving public companies, actual loss is likely to control at 
sentencing due to the difficulty in identifying the loss “intended” by a corporate executive who 
manipulated the corporation for disparate ends such as prestige, job security, and personal 
portfolio gains. Buell, supra note 123, at 1620. 
 127. 2009 SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 71, § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id.; see also Buell, supra note 123, at 1626 (observing that in accounting fraud cases, 
“the issues of loss amount and causation get thorny”). 
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Although determining the loss a defendant caused may be 
straightforward in a simple fraud case,131 the issue becomes clouded in 
more typical white-collar cases involving a publicly traded company. 
In such a scenario, multiple victims trade multiple securities over 
many months during the perpetration of a fraud. During this period, 
those securities may change hands several times and fluctuate in value 
for any number of reasons. The loss calculation therefore becomes 
extremely difficult.132 Although the Guidelines require sentencing 
courts to make only a “reasonable estimate of the loss,”133 several 
appellate courts have confirmed that this analysis is nonetheless 
complex.134 In United States v. Olis,135 for example, the Fifth Circuit 
applied the principles of loss causation used in civil securities fraud 
cases136 to the criminal context.137 The court held that for a loss 
calculation in a securities fraud case to be reasonable, a sentencing 
court must determine the amount of the decline in the corporation’s 
share price attributable to the defendant’s participation in the fraud.138 
 
 131. See Buell, supra note 123, at 1625–26 (observing that when a con man convinces an 
elderly woman that a $100,000 antique dresser is worth only $500, and purchases it for that 
amount, the victim’s loss is $99,500). 
 132. See United States v. Rutkoske, 506 F.3d 170, 179 (2d Cir. 2007) (“Determining the 
extent to which a defendant’s fraud . . . caused shareholders’ losses inevitably cannot be an exact 
science.”); United States v. Ebbers, 458 F.3d 110, 127 (2d Cir. 2006) (“Determining this [loss] 
amount is no easy task.”). 
 133. 2009 SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 71, § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3. 
 134. See, e.g., United States v. Olis (Olis I), 429 F.3d 540, 546–47 (5th Cir. 2005) (rejecting an 
oversimplified “market capitalization” approach to the loss calculation whereby the sentencing 
court based loss on “a gross correlation between stock price decline and the revelation of a 
fraudulent transaction”); see also Rutkoske, 506 F.3d at 180 (“The District Court’s basic failure 
at least to approximate the amount of the loss caused by the fraud without even considering 
other factors relevant to a decline in [the company’s] share price requires a remand to 
redetermine the amount of the loss . . . .”). 
 135. United States v. Olis (Olis I), 429 F.3d 540 (5th Cir. 2005). 
 136. In Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005), the Supreme Court held 
that basic proximate cause principles apply to securities fraud in the same manner that they 
apply to common law fraud. See id. at 338 (observing that “[a] private plaintiff who claims 
securities fraud must prove that the defendant’s fraud caused an economic loss”). In so holding, 
the Court rejected the Eighth and Ninth Circuits’ position that merely pleading that a fraud 
inflated a stock’s purchase price suffices to state a claim. David H. Angeli & Per A. Ramfjord, 
Reexamining ‘Loss’ and ‘Gain’ in the Wake of Dura Pharmaceuticals v. Broudo—New 
Ammunition for Securities Fraud Defendants, 30 CHAMPION 10, 10 n.8 (2006). 
 137. Olis I, 429 F.3d at 546. 
 138. See id. (“Where the value of a security declines for other reasons, however, such 
decline, or component of the decline, is not a ‘loss’ attributable to the misrepresentation.”). 
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The Second Circuit reached this same conclusion in United States v. 
Rutkoske,139 as did the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Zolp.140 
Because few district court judges have the necessary training to 
engage in the intensive economic analysis that Olis, Zolp, and 
Rutkoske required, the loss calculation in most cases becomes a battle 
of expert witnesses.141 In this process, the expert witnesses for the 
prosecution and the defense invariably arrive at widely divergent 
estimates of the loss the defendant caused142 and the judge is left to 
decide which expert is more persuasive.143 Faced with this challenge, 
at least one court has simply given up, deciding that the amount of 
loss could not be determined in the case before it.144 
III.  THE NEED TO REFORM THE CURRENT SENTENCING REGIME 
GOVERNING WHITE-COLLAR CRIMINAL CASES 
The sentencing of federal white-collar criminal defendants is 
deeply flawed. The Guidelines recommend sentences that are 
generally too harsh. Moreover, the Guidelines place undue emphasis 
on the loss calculation, an imprecise measure that fails to accurately 
correlate with a defendant’s culpability. 
 
 139. See United States v. Rutkoske, 506 F.3d 170, 179 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[L]osses from causes 
other than the fraud must be excluded from the loss calculation.” (quoting United States v. 
Ebbers, 458 F.3d 110, 128 (2d Cir. 2006))). 
 140. See United States v. Zolp, 479 F.3d 715, 719 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he court must 
disentangle the underlying value of the stock, inflation of that value due to the fraud, and either 
inflation or deflation of that value due to unrelated causes.”). 
 141. Examples of such battles abound in white-collar fraud cases. See, e.g., United States v. 
Ferguson, 584 F. Supp. 2d 447, 449–50 (D. Conn. 2008); United States v. Adelson, 441 F. Supp. 
2d 506, 510 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); United States v. Brown, 338 F. Supp. 2d 552, 558 (M.D. Pa. 2004); 
United States v. Bakhit, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1232, 1239 (C.D. Cal. 2002). 
 142. Buell, supra note 123, at 1632; see also, e.g., Ferguson, 584 F. Supp. 2d at 449–50 (“[The 
government’s expert] opined that his best estimate of the . . . loss was between $1.2 billion and 
$1.4 billion,” whereas the defense expert concluded that “the amount of loss due to the . . . fraud 
that can actually be calculated is zero.”). 
 143. Buell, supra note 123, at 1632. 
 144. Id. at 1633–34; see also United States v. Olis (Olis II), No. H-03-217-01, 2006 WL 
2716048, at *8–9 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 22, 2006) (“[T]he court is compelled to conclude that the 
confounding announcements and the unprovable assumptions on which [the government’s 
expert] necessarily relied in reaching his estimate of actual loss demonstrate that it is not 
possible to estimate with any degree of reasonable certainty the actual loss to shareholders 
caused by [the disclosure of the defendant’s fraudulent actions].”). 
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A.  The Severity of the Guidelines Governing White-Collar Crime  
Since the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2001, the Guidelines have 
recommended excessively high sentences for white-collar crimes. The 
recommended sentences for high-loss white-collar crimes eclipse the 
sentences typically imposed for murder145 and serial child 
molestation.146 In some cases, the recommendations are so high that 
they are “literally[,] off the chart.”147 
United States v. Adelson148 aptly illustrates this phenomenon. This 
case concerned Richard Adelson, the president of Impath, a publicly 
traded company.149 From 2001 to 2003, Adelson participated in a 
conspiracy to commit securities fraud and filed several false reports 
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on Impath’s behalf.150 
But Adelson was a latecomer to the conspiracy, which various Impath 
accounting executives had concocted earlier in response to pressure 
from the corporation’s CEO.151 Moreover, Adelson was motivated not 
by greed, but rather by fear. Judge Rakoff found that “Adelson was 
sucked into the fraud not because he sought to inflate the company’s 
earnings, but because, as President of the company, he feared the 
effects of exposing what he had belatedly learned was the substantial 
fraud perpetrated by others.”152 Nevertheless, the Guidelines 
calculations imposed upon Adelson an offense level of forty-six, three 
levels higher than that needed to yield a recommendation of life in 
 
 145. See Adelson, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 509 (“[A]n Offense Level of 55 is a level normally only 
seen in cases involving major international narcotics traffickers, Mafia dons, and the like.”); see 
also, e.g., United States v. Masferrer, 514 F.3d 1158, 1163 (11th Cir. 2008) (upholding a 
Guidelines sentence of thirty years in prison); Adelson, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 511 (observing that 
the Guidelines recommend life imprisonment). The average murderer is sentenced to less than 
nineteen years in prison. Bowman, supra note 47, at 169 (citing U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 
2005 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS 256 (2006)). 
 146. See United States v. Ebbers, 458 F.3d 110, 129 (2d Cir. 2006) (“Twenty-five years is a 
long sentence for a white collar crime, longer than the sentences routinely imposed by many 
states for violent crimes, including murder, or other serious crimes such as serial child 
molestation.”). 
 147. Adelson, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 509; see also Bowman, supra note 47, at 168 (observing that 
the Guidelines “generat[e] sentencing ranges for [white-collar] property crimes from 5 to 14 
notches higher than necessary for life imprisonment”). 
 148. United States v. Adelson, 441 F. Supp. 2d 506 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). For additional details 
regarding this case, see supra Introduction. 
 149. Id. at 507. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 513. 
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prison.153 Recognizing the excessive nature of this sentence, Judge 
Rakoff refused to apply it.154 In his sentencing memorandum, the 
judge did not mince words, describing the Guidelines’ 
recommendation as “barbari[c],”155 and “patently absurd on [its] 
face.”156 
Adelson’s case is not unique. Several commentators have 
expressed frustration with the severity of the current Guidelines. 
Professor Bowman, for example, has observed that “under the 
current Guidelines a corporate officer who presides over a fraud 
involving securities and a loss of only $2.5 million can qualify for life 
imprisonment.”157 In United States v. Parris,158 Judge Block lamented 
that the Guidelines effectively recommend life imprisonment when an 
officer or director of virtually any public corporation is found guilty 
of securities fraud.159 
In addition to far exceeding the severity necessary to achieve 
retributive justice, the Guidelines are much more severe than 
necessary to effectively deter white-collar crime. Short but certain 
prison terms provide substantial deterrence for would-be white-collar 
criminals.160 
 
 153. Id. at 511 (determining Adelson’s offense level to be forty-six, and observing that “the 
guidelines recommend life imprisonment for every offense level over 42”). 
 154. See id. at 507 (“In the end, however, the Court imposed a non-guideline sentence of 42 
months imprisonment . . . .”); id. at 512 (“[T]he Court, confronted with an absurd guideline 
result . . . chose to focus its primary attention on the non-guidelines factors set forth in 
§ 3553(a) . . . .”). 
 155. Id. at 511. 
 156. Id. at 515. 
 157. Bowman, supra note 47, at 168 & n.20. 
 158. United States v. Parris, 573 F. Supp. 2d 744 (E.D.N.Y. 2008). 
 159. See id. at 754 (“[W]e now have an advisory guidelines regime where . . . any officer or 
director of virtually any public corporation who has committed securities fraud will be 
confronted with a guidelines calculation either calling for or approaching lifetime 
imprisonment.”). Judge Lake expressed a similar sentiment in United States v. Olis (Olis II), No. 
H-03-217-01, 2006 WL 2716048 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 22, 2006). In that case—decided prior to the 
Supreme Court’s Booker decision—Judge Lake had been forced to impose a Guidelines 
sentence of 292 months. Id. at *1. Reconsidering the sentence following Booker, Judge Lake 
recognized the inappropriate severity of the Guidelines calculation. See id. at *13 (“[T]he court 
concludes that a sentence within the applicable guideline range would not be reasonable . . . .”). 
Judge Lake therefore deviated from the Guidelines and imposed a sentence of only seventy-two 
months. Id. 
 160. Members of the Sentencing Commission believed that “short but definite” sentences 
for white-collar criminals would have high deterrent value. Breyer, supra note 22, at 22; see also 
Adelson, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 514 (drawing support for the deterrent value of short but definite 
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B.  The Guidelines’ Destructive Focus on Loss 
In addition to recommending sentences that are generally too 
high, the Guidelines attach undue weight to the amount of the loss a 
defendant causes. The loss calculation is imprecise and correlates 
poorly with a defendant’s real culpability. 
1. The Loss Calculation’s Imprecision.  Neither Congress nor the 
Sentencing Commission has offered sentencing courts any real 
guidance on performing the loss calculation.161 This lack of guidance, 
combined with the inherent complexity of the calculation, means the 
loss figure often seems arbitrary. It is usually based on the 
formulations of expert witnesses, and defense and government 
experts invariably reach widely divergent figures.162 Even a single 
expert can produce a wide range of loss figures, depending on the 
assumptions the expert includes in the model.163 In United States v. 
Ferguson,164 for example, the government’s expert witness produced 
several estimates of the loss, ranging from $344 million to $1.4 
billion.165 When the loss a defendant causes is so abstract that not even 
a court-recognized expert can quantify it with any precision, the 
figure says little about the moral blameworthiness of a defendant’s 
conduct. 
2. The Loss Calculation’s Weak Correlation to a Defendant’s 
Culpability.  Even if the loss a defendant caused could be precisely 
and reliably determined, it would still only poorly approximate a 
defendant’s culpability. The Guidelines’ emphasis on the loss 
calculation obscures other important indicia of culpability, such as the 
defendant’s position within the company, the extent of the 
defendant’s involvement in the criminal conduct, and the profit that 
 
prison sentences from Richard Frase, Punishment Purposes, 58 STAN. L. REV. 67, 80 (2005), and 
Elizabeth Szockyj, Imprisoning White Collar Criminals?, 23 S. ILL. U. L.J. 485, 492 (1998)). 
 161. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 162. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 163. See, e.g., United States v. Ferguson, 584 F. Supp. 2d 447, 449–50 (D. Conn. 2008) 
(discussing how different studies used by the government’s expert witness to estimate loss 
produced a wide range of loss figures). 
 164. United States v. Ferguson, 584 F. Supp. 2d 447 (D. Conn. 2008). 
 165. See id. at 449 (“The Government’s expert . . . opined that his best estimate of 
the . . . loss was between $1.2 billion and $1.4 billion, though he also provided several other loss 
calculations ranging from $344 million to $598 million.”). 
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the defendant obtained by participating in the fraud.166 To more 
clearly illustrate the shortcomings of the Guidelines’ focus on the loss 
calculation, consider the following two hypothetical white-collar 
criminals. 
First, consider John, an accounting executive at a publicly traded 
corporation. The company’s $1 billion worth of stock is held by 
thousands of people. In the course of his ordinary employment duties, 
John becomes aware of an ongoing conspiracy to fraudulently inflate 
the company’s earnings. Because of the nature of John’s employment, 
he must either approve these inflated figures and join the conspiracy 
or report the fraud. He fears that, should he report the fraud, he will 
lose his job in the aftermath. He expects the corporation’s share price 
to plummet in response to the amended financial statements and its 
capital to dry up as investors and would-be creditors lose confidence 
in the firm’s management. John therefore joins the conspiracy. John is 
not a conspiracy leader, and at no point does he derive any personal 
benefit from the fraud beyond that incidental to the inflated health of 
the firm. When the fraud is later discovered, John is convicted. The 
court can precisely determine167 that the fraud caused a 10 percent 
drop in the company’s share price, producing a loss of $101 million. 
Next, consider Robert, the president of an investment firm with 
three employees. Robert solicits and obtains contributions from 250 
wealthy individuals, totaling $101 million. Instead of investing this 
money, Robert engages in a classic Ponzi scheme. He misappropriates 
the funds for his own personal consumption and, to discourage his 
investors from withdrawing their money, falsely reports astronomical 
returns. The fraud is eventually discovered, but not before the money 
is spent and the fund is worthless. The court finds that Robert has 
caused a loss of $101 million, the value of the misappropriated funds. 
Although John and Robert behaved very differently, the 
Sentencing Guidelines fail to reflect this fact.168 Both John and Robert 
 
 166. See Podgor, supra note 17, at 756–57 (“Courts seldom consider where the individual 
may be on the corporate ladder, the extent to which he or she is directly engaged in the criminal 
conduct, and any individual profit obtained as a result of engaging in the improper activity.” 
(citations omitted)). 
 167. This is rarely possible in reality. See supra Part III.B.1. 
 168. John’s total offense level would be between forty-seven and forty-nine, depending on 
whether the sentencing judge found him to be a minor participant in the fraud. John would 
begin with an offense level of seven, 2009 SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 71, § 2B1.1(a), 
and would be subject to the following offense level increases: (1) twenty-six levels for the $100 
million dollar loss, id. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(N); (2) six levels for committing a fraud that involved more 
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begin with the same offense level.169 They also receive the same 
offense-level enhancements for the amount of loss they caused and 
the number of victims they harmed as well as for jeopardizing the 
health of their respective firms, violating securities laws while holding 
their respective positions, and abusing positions of trust.170 Although 
the Guidelines consider John and Robert’s respective roles in the 
fraud, the effect of considering this factor is minute, accounting for a 
difference of between two and four offense levels.171 By comparison, 
the loss calculation accounts for a twenty-six offense level increase.172 
Moreover, the difference between John and Robert’s respective roles 
has no practical effect given the extreme nature of the Guidelines’ 
recommendations. After either defendant has exceeded a total 
offense level of forty-two, the Guidelines recommend the maximum 
statutorily permissible sentence; it makes no difference whether a 
defendant’s offense level is a forty-seven or a fifty-one. 
The Guidelines fail to achieve justice in white-collar criminal 
cases. Their sentencing recommendations are irrationally high and, 
due to the Guidelines’ overemphasis on the loss calculation, fail to 
accurately reflect a defendant’s culpability. 
IV. KIMBROUGH V. UNITED STATES AS AN AVENUE FOR REFORM 
With its opinion in Kimbrough v. United States, the Supreme 
Court has opened the door to systemic change in the way white-collar 
criminals are sentenced. In Kimbrough, the Supreme Court upheld a 
 
than 249 victims, id. § 2B1.1(b)(2)(C); (3) four levels for jeopardizing the financial security of a 
publicly traded company or financial institution, id. § 2B1.1(b)(14)(A)–(C); (4) four levels for 
violating securities law while an officer of a publicly traded company or an investment advisor, 
id. § 2B1.1(b)(17)(A); and (5) two levels for abusing a position of trust or using a special skill to 
facilitate or conceal the offense, id. § 3B1.3. John’s offense level might be reduced by two if the 
sentencing judge found him to be only a minor participant in the fraud. Id. § 3B1.2(b). Robert’s 
offense level would be fifty-one. Robert would also begin with an offense level of seven, id. § 
2B1.1(a), and would be subject to the same offense level enhancements as John, id. §§ 
2B1.1(b)(1)(N), 2B1.1(b)(2)(C), 2B1.1(b)(14)(A)–(C), 2B1.1(b)(17)(A), 3B1.3. Robert would 
not be eligible for the two-level reduction for minor involvement in the offense, id. § 3B1.2(b), 
and would instead be subject to an additional two-level increase for his leadership role, id. § 
3B1.1(c). The Guidelines recommend a life sentence for all offense levels over forty-two. Id. ch., 
5 pt. A. 
 169. See supra note 168. 
 170. See supra note 168. 
 171. John might be eligible for a two-level reduction to his offense level for his minor role in 
the fraud, 2009 SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 71, § 3B1.2(b), and Robert would be 
subject to a two-level increase for his leadership role, id. § 3B1.1(c). 
 172. See supra note 168. 
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deviation from the Guidelines governing crack cocaine offenses based 
on a sentencing judge’s policy disagreement with those Guidelines’ 
recommendations.173 If this policy discretion were extended to the 
sentencing of white-collar criminals, sentencing judges could 
disregard the strictures of the loss calculation and restore rationality 
to the sentencing of white-collar criminal defendants. 
The Kimbrough opinion is subject to two possible 
interpretations. Kimbrough can be read broadly to allow judges 
unfettered discretion to deviate from any guideline based on the 
judge’s policy disagreement with that guideline.174 Language in the 
Kimbrough opinion, however, suggests that the Court’s holding may 
be limited in two significant ways. First, some language in the opinion 
suggests that policy-based discretion may be applicable only to a 
narrower class of guidelines: those that—like the Guidelines 
governing crack cocaine offenses—were not calibrated as a result of 
the Sentencing Commission’s reasoned assessment of empirical data 
and national experience.175 Second, the Court’s opinion raises the 
possibility that policy-based discretion is not appropriate when 
guidelines result from an explicit congressional directive.176 
Despite these potential limitations, sentencing courts can and 
should use Kimbrough to restore rationality to the sentencing of 
white-collar criminals by recognizing the loss calculation as bad policy 
and declining to impose the sentences it recommends. This course is 
possible under the broader reading of the Court’s Kimbrough 
holding. This Part will argue, however, that even under a narrow 
interpretation of Kimbrough, the opinion grants sentencing courts 
discretion to deviate from the Guidelines’ recommendations in white-
collar criminal cases based purely upon the judge’s policy 
disagreement with the loss calculation.177 
 
 173. See Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 558, 564 (2007) (“The question here 
presented is whether, as the Court of Appeals held in this case, ‘a sentence . . . outside the 
guidelines range is per se unreasonable when it is based on a disagreement with the sentencing 
disparity for crack and powder cocaine offenses.’ We hold that, under Booker, the cocaine 
Guidelines, like all other Guidelines, are advisory only, and that the Court of Appeals erred in 
holding the crack/powder disparity effectively mandatory.” (citation omitted) (quoting United 
States v. Kimbrough, 174 Fed. App’x 798, 799 (4th Cir. 2006) (per curiam))). 
 174. See infra Part IV.A. 
 175. See infra Part IV.B.1. 
 176. See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 177. See infra Part IV.C. 
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This Part will proceed in three steps. First, this Part will describe 
the Kimbrough holding at its most broad level.178 Next, this Part will 
discuss the language in Kimbrough that potentially limits the scope of 
the opinion.179 Finally, this Part will argue that Kimbrough grants 
sentencing judges discretion in white-collar criminal cases even if 
interpreted narrowly.180 In making this argument, this Part compares 
the Guidelines governing white-collar crime to those governing crack 
cocaine offenses and concludes that both sets of Guidelines lack 
grounding in the Sentencing Commission’s assessment of empirical 
data and national experience. The Part further concludes that neither 
the 100-to-1 crack/powder cocaine disparity nor the Guidelines’ 
emphasis on the loss calculation was incorporated as the result of a 
congressional directive.181 
A.  The Supreme Court’s Kimbrough Holding at Its Broadest 
Read broadly, Kimbrough v. United States stands for the 
proposition that a sentencing judge may apply a sentence outside a 
guideline’s recommended range based purely on a policy 
disagreement with that guideline’s calculation.182 
In Kimbrough, a district court judge imposed a sentence for 
possession of crack cocaine183 that was far below the recommended 
Guidelines range.184 The district court considered the defendant’s 
individual “history and characteristics,” but the judge’s dominant 
rationale for deviating from the Guidelines range was the judge’s 
policy disagreement with what he considered to be the 
“disproportionate and unjust effect” of the Guidelines’ disparate 
treatment of crack and powder cocaine at sentencing.185 Specifically, 
the judge disagreed with the Guidelines’ treatment of the possession 
of crack cocaine as tantamount to the possession of one hundred 
 
 178. See infra Part IV.A. 
 179. See infra Part IV.B. 
 180. See infra Part IV.C. 
 181. See infra Part IV.C. 
 182. See supra note 173. 
 183. Specifically, Kimbrough pleaded guilty to four offenses: conspiracy to distribute crack 
and powder cocaine, possession with intent to distribute more than fifty grams of crack cocaine, 
possession with intent to distribute powder cocaine, and possession of a firearm in furtherance 
of a drug trafficking offense. Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 558, 564 (2007). 
 184. See id. at 565 (observing that the sentencing judge imposed a sentence of 180 months 
when the Guidelines called for a sentence of 228 to 270 months). 
 185. Id. 
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times that much powder cocaine.186 The district court held that this 
treatment yielded a sentence greater than necessary to achieve the 
purposes of sentencing outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).187 
In its Kimbrough opinion, the Supreme Court approved the 
district court’s use of discretion on these grounds, holding that a 
sentence based on such policy disagreement was entitled to the same 
reasonableness review as any other.188 According to the Supreme 
Court, “[t]he ultimate question in Kimbrough’s case [was] ‘whether 
the sentence was reasonable—i.e., whether the District Judge abused 
his discretion’” in applying a sentence he thought just.189 In reaching 
this decision, the Supreme Court abrogated contrary holdings in the 
First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits.190 
Indeed, some appellate courts have already hinted at adopting 
this broad reading.191 The Fifth Circuit has gone so far as to state that 
“Kimbrough does not limit the relevance of a district court’s policy 
disagreement with the Guidelines to the situations such as the cocaine 
disparity and whatever might be considered similar.”192 
 
 186. See id. (“The [district] court also commented that the case exemplified the 
‘disproportionate and unjust effect that crack cocaine guidelines have in sentencing.’”); id. at 
566 (“Although chemically similar, crack and powder cocaine are handled very differently for 
sentencing purposes. The 100-to-1 ratio yields sentences for crack offenses three to six times 
longer than those for powder offenses involving equal amounts of drugs.”). 
 187. Id. at 565. 
 188. See id. at 576 (“The ultimate question in Kimbrough’s case is ‘whether the sentence was 
reasonable—i.e., whether the District Judge abused his discretion . . . .’”). 
 189. Id. (quoting Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 600 (2007)). 
 190. See United States v. Johnson, 474 F.3d 515, 522 (8th Cir. 2007) (holding that courts may 
not impose a sentence outside of the Guidelines range because of a disagreement with the 
sentencing ratio); United States v. Castillo, 460 F.3d 337, 357–58 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that a 
court could not reject the Guidelines sentencing ratio on purely policy-based reasons); United 
States v. Williams, 456 F.3d 1353, 1368–69 (11th Cir. 2006) (holding that the district court’s 
disagreement with the policy of employing the crack-to-powder cocaine ratio was not a 
permissible sentencing factor); United States v. Eura, 440 F.3d 625, 636 (4th Cir. 2006) (holding 
that variance from the Guidelines cannot be based solely on the court’s disagreement with the 
sentencing ratio); United States v. Pho, 433 F.3d 53, 64–65 (1st Cir. 2006) (holding that a district 
court could not impose a sentence outside the Guidelines range based on its rejection of the 
100-to-1 crack-to-powder cocaine sentencing ratio). 
 191. See Carissa Byrne Hessick, Appellate Review of Sentencing Policy Decisions After 
Kimbrough, 93 MARQ. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 14–15), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1433581 (observing that the Second, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits have 
issued opinions expressing skepticism of the potential limitations alluded to in the Supreme 
Court’s Kimbrough opinion). Professor Hessick cites United States v. Jones, 531 F.3d 163, 173 
(2d Cir. 2008), United States v. Evans, 526 F.3d 155, 165 (4th Cir. 2008), and United States v. 
Simmons, 568 F.3d 564, 569 (5th Cir. 2009) in support of this proposition. Id. at 15 nn.92–94. 
 192. Hessick, supra note 191, at 15 (quoting Simmons, 568 F.3d at 569). 
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B.  A Narrower Interpretation of Kimbrough 
Although it is evident that Kimbrough struck a strong blow in 
favor of a judge’s discretion at sentencing,193 language in Kimbrough 
suggests that its holding might be limited in two significant ways.194 
First, the Court indicates that a judge’s discretion to deviate from the 
Guidelines for policy reasons might be limited to Guidelines that are 
not based upon the Sentencing Commission’s consideration of 
empirical evidence and past national experience.195 Second, language 
in the Court’s opinion indicates that policy-based deviation from a 
guideline’s calculation may be inappropriate when the guideline at 
issue resulted from an explicit congressional directive.196 
1. Guidelines Promulgated Pursuant to the Characteristic 
Institutional Role of the Sentencing Commission.  Language in the 
Court’s Kimbrough opinion suggests that a sentencing judge’s policy-
based discretion might be limited when the guideline at issue results 
from the Sentencing Commission’s exercise of its discrete institutional 
role. Writing for the majority, Justice Ginsburg took notice of the 
characteristic institutional roles played by the Sentencing 
Commission and a sentencing judge. The Sentencing Commission, 
Ginsburg observed, “has the capacity courts lack to ‘base its 
determinations on empirical data and national experience, guided by 
a professional staff with appropriate expertise.’”197 A sentencing 
court, on the other hand, is better equipped to evaluate the individual 
circumstances of a particular defendant before it.198 Justice Ginsburg 
 
 193. See United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 191 (2d Cir. 2008) (observing that with its 
opinions in Gall, Rita, and Kimbrough, the Supreme Court sent a message that “responsibility 
for sentencing is placed largely in the precincts of the district courts”). 
 194. See id. at 192 (“We do not, however, take the Supreme Court’s comments concerning 
the scope and nature of ‘closer review’ to be the last word on these questions. More will have to 
be fleshed out as issues present themselves.”). 
 195. See Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 574–75. The opinion observes that the Sentencing 
Commission “has the capacity courts lack to ‘base its determinations on empirical data and 
national experience,’” id. at 574 (quoting United States v. Pruitt, 502 F.3d 1154, 1171 (10th Cir. 
2007) (McConnell, J., concurring)), and that in light of these considerations, “closer review may 
be in order” when the Guidelines result from the exercise of this characteristic institutional role, 
id. at 575. 
 196. See id. at 570–71 (observing that the government contends that the Sentencing 
Guidelines carry special weight where they result from a congressional policy directive, but 
finding that the crack/powder sentencing did not so result). 
 197. Id. at 574 (quoting Pruitt, 502 F.3d at 1171 (McConnell, J., concurring)). 
 198. Id. 
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suggested that the reasonableness of a district court’s deviation from 
the Guidelines range may be evaluated on a sliding scale. A non-
Guidelines sentence is more likely to be found reasonable when it is 
based on the exceptional circumstances of the defendant.199 When the 
defendant’s circumstances are unremarkable and the Guidelines’ 
recommendation is based on the Commission’s assessment of 
empirical data and national experience, Justice Ginsburg writes that a 
district court’s deviation from the Guidelines range may be subject to 
“closer review.”200 
Justice Ginsburg did not engage this issue in the Court’s 
Kimbrough opinion, however. Instead, she found that the sentencing 
disparity between crack and powder cocaine was not based on the 
Commission’s reasoned assessment of empirical data and past 
national experience,201 and therefore the specter of “closer review” 
did not apply in Kimbrough.202 Justice Ginsburg observed that 
although most of the Guidelines’ recommended sentencing ranges 
were calibrated according to the typical past practice of sentencing 
judges,203 the sentencing ranges for crack and powder cocaine 
possession, at the time of their creation, reflected a then-existing 
sentiment that possession of crack was an especially serious drug 
offense,204 and resulted from the Commission’s effort to mirror the 
treatment of crack cocaine under the 1986 Anti-Drug Abuse Act.205 
Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion therefore leaves open the 
possibility that  a sentencing judge is not entitled to deviate from a 
 
 199. See id. at 574–75 (“[A] district court’s decision to vary from the advisory Guidelines 
may attract greatest respect when the sentencing judge finds a particular case ‘outside the 
“heartland” to which the Commission intends individual Guidelines to apply.’” (quoting Rita v. 
United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2465 (2007)). 
 200. See id. at 575 (“[C]loser review may be in order when the sentencing judge varies from 
the Guidelines based solely on the judge’s view that the Guidelines range ‘fails properly to 
reflect § 3553(a) considerations’ . . . .” (quoting Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2465 (2007))). 
 201. See id. (“The crack cocaine Guidelines, however, present no occasion for elaborative 
discussion of this matter because those Guidelines do not exemplify the Commission’s exercise 
of its characteristic institutional role.”). 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. at 567. 
 204. Id. 
 205. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SPECIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: COCAINE AND 
FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY 1 (1995) (“The current sentencing structure for cocaine offenses 
is primarily the result of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986.”); see also Kimbrough, 128 S.Ct. at 
567 (“The Commission did not use [an] empirical approach in developing the Guidelines 
sentences for drug-trafficking offenses. Instead, it employed the 1986 Act’s weight-driven 
scheme.”). 
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guideline based on pure policy grounds when that guideline was 
formulated pursuant to the Sentencing Commission’s exercise of its 
characteristic institutional role.206 
2. Guidelines Promulgated in Response to a Congressional 
Directive.  Further language in the Court’s Kimbrough opinion 
suggests the potential for an additional limitation where a guideline’s 
recommendation results from an explicit congressional directive. 
In Kimbrough, the government argued that sentencing judges 
should not be allowed to substitute their own policy judgment for that 
of Congress.207 The government conceded in its brief that sentencing 
judges have broad discretion to disagree with the Sentencing 
Guidelines’ recommendations on policy grounds in the ordinary 
case.208 The government argued, however, that the sentencing 
disparity between crack and powder cocaine presented a special case 
because the Sentencing Commission incorporated this feature into 
the Guidelines to give effect to congressional policy. The government 
thus argued that the Guidelines governing crack cocaine offenses 
were entitled to special weight that precluded a sentencing judge from 
deviating from them based purely on policy grounds.209 
Although Justice Ginsburg and the Kimbrough majority 
dismissed this argument, the Court declined to engage the 
government’s underlying contention that a congressional directive 
can trumps a sentencing court’s policy discretion.210 Instead, the Court 
again sidestepped the issue, finding that the sentencing disparity 
between crack and powder cocaine did not result from an explicit 
congressional directive and that the government’s contention was 
therefore irrelevant to Kimbrough’s case.211 
 
 206. Hessick, supra note 191, 11–12 (“[T]he Court has suggested that the level of appellate 
scrutiny for non-Guidelines sentences that are based on policy disagreement may turn on 
whether a particular Guideline was derived from ‘empirical data and national experience.’” 
(quoting Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 575)). 
 207. Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 570 (citing Brief for the United States at 25, Kimbrough, 128 
S. Ct. 558 (No. 06-6330)). 
 208. Id. (citing Brief for the United States, supra note 207, at 16. 
 209. Id. (citing Brief for the United States, supra note 207, at 25). 
 210. See id. at 571 (finding no “implicit directive” in the 1986 Anti-Drug Abuse Act). 
 211. Id. 
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C.  The Case for Deviating from the Guidelines Governing White-
Collar Crime Even Under a Narrow Interpretation of Kimbrough  
Neither of these potential limitations should apply to the 
sentencing of white-collar criminals. Like the crack-powder 
sentencing disparity, the fraud Guidelines resulted neither from the 
Sentencing Commission’s exercise of its characteristic institutional 
role nor from an explicit congressional directive. This Section 
examines each of these potential limitations in turn, comparing the 
origin of the crack-powder sentencing disparity to that of the 
Guidelines governing white-collar crime. This Section concludes that 
the rationale employed by the Court in Kimbrough should extend 
equally to the Guidelines governing white-collar crime. Kimbrough’s 
grant of discretion should apply to the sentencing of white-collar 
criminals even in light of these potential limitations. 
1. The White-Collar Crime Guidelines and the Commission’s 
Characteristic Institutional Role.  Like the Guidelines governing crack 
cocaine offenses,212 the Guidelines governing white-collar crime did 
not result from the Sentencing Commission’s exercise of its 
characteristic institutional role. These Guidelilnes were not calibrated 
pursuant to the Commission’s assessment of empirical data and 
national experience. Instead, they resulted from a combination of the 
Commission’s policy determinations, reaction to public sentiment, 
and a desire to implement congressional policy. 
In a 1995 report to Congress, the Sentencing Commission 
recalled the environment in which the crack cocaine Guidelines were 
enacted. The Commission noted that “[d]rug abuse in general, and 
crack cocaine in particular, had become in public opinion and in 
[Congress] members’ minds a problem of overwhelming 
dimensions.”213 Additionally, Congress apparently believed that crack 
cocaine was significantly more harmful than powder cocaine.214 
These sentiments led Congress to pass the 1986 Anti-Drug 
Abuse Act,215 which strengthened mandatory minimum sentences for 
 
 212. See supra Part IV.B.1. 
 213. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 205, at 121. 
 214. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT TO CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL 
SENTENCING POLICY 90 (2002). 
 215. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 18–21 U.S.C.). 
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drug offenders.216 The Anti-Drug Abuse Act manifested Congress’s 
particular apprehension toward crack cocaine. It treated the 
possession of a gram of crack cocaine as equivalent to the possession 
of one hundred grams of powder cocaine.217 
The Sentencing Guidelines, drafted shortly after the 1986 Anti-
Drug Abuse Act’s passage, were designed to mirror that legislation’s 
disparate treatment of crack and powder cocaine. In Kimbrough, 
Justice Ginsburg explicitly observed that with respect to the crack 
cocaine Guidelines, the Sentencing Commission deviated from its 
usual method of calibrating the Guidelines based on the typical past 
practice of sentencing judges.218 Instead, “[the Commission] employed 
the 1986 Act’s weight-driven scheme.”219 Justice Ginsburg concluded 
that, for this reason, “[t]he Commission did not use [an] empirical 
approach in developing the Guidelines sentences for drug-trafficking 
offenses.”220 Consequently, the Court held that the specter of “closer 
review” did not apply to the crack-powder sentencing disparity and 
that sentencing judges could freely deviate from the crack cocaine 
Guidelines based principally on policy grounds. 
Likewise, the Guidelines governing the sentencing of white-
collar criminals were not based on the Sentencing Commission’s 
assessment of empirical data and national experience. Rather, the 
Commission explicitly chose to deviate from its ordinary quantitative 
approach in calibrating these Guidelines.221 Instead of basing the 
Guidelines on the past practice of sentencing judges, the Commission 
applied its own independent assessment of the severity of white-collar 
crime.222 As a result, the Guidelines’ recommendations were 
calibrated to yield sentences higher than those that previously had 
been imposed on white-collar criminals.223 Subsequent adjustments to 
the white-collar crime Guidelines only reinforced this departure from 
the Sentencing Commission’s typical practice.224 
 
 216. Id. § 1002, 100 Stat. at 3207–2 to –4 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1) (2006)). 
 217. Id. 
 218. Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 558, 567 (2007). For a description of the 
Commission’s calibration of the Guidelines, see supra Part I.A.1. 
 219. Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 567. 
 220. Id. 
 221. See supra notes 39–45 and accompanying text. 
 222. See supra notes 39–45 and accompanying text. 
 223. See supra notes 39–45 and accompanying text. 
 224. See supra Part I.B.  
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Neither the Guidelines governing crack-cocaine offenses nor 
those governing white-collar crime resulted from the Sentencing 
Commission’s consideration of judges’ past practice. Instead, these 
Guidelines are a product of the political environment in which they 
were promulgated, the Commission’s desire that the Guidelines 
reflect perceived congressional policy,  and the Commission’s own 
independent policy determinations concerning the severity of a 
particular class of conduct. Because neither of these sets of 
Guidelines stemmed from the Sentencing Commission’s exercise of 
its characteristic institutional role, they are not subject to the “closer 
review” alluded to in the Supreme Court’s Kimbrough opinion. 
2. The White-Collar Crime Guidelines and Congressional 
Directives.  Although the Commission’s desire to give effect to 
congressional policy informed both the Guidelines governing white-
collar crime and those governing cocaine offenses, the Commission 
did not promulgate either set of Guidelines pursuant to an explicit 
congressional directive. 
The crack-powder sentencing disparity originated with the 1986 
Anti-Drug Abuse Act.225 Although Congress viewed the disparity as 
sound policy with respect to statutory minimums and maximums, the 
Kimbrough Court explicitly noted that the Act states nothing about 
how the Commission should calibrate Guidelines sentences within 
these brackets.226 Consequently, the Court rejected the government’s 
argument, holding that it “lack[ed] grounding in the text of the 1986 
Act.”227 
Likewise, the Commission likely did not promulgate the 
Guidelines governing the sentencing of white-collar criminals in 
response to an explicit congressional directive. Indeed, the initial 
white-collar crime Guidelines had no statutory foundation beyond 
that common to all sentencing guidelines: the 1984 Comprehensive 
Crime Control Act.228 
 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act prompted the Sentencing Commission 
to revise the white-collar crime Guidelines, but it did so in the form of 
an invitation rather than a demand. Sarbanes-Oxley stated that the 
 
 225. See supra notes 215–19 and accompanying text. 
 226. See Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 558, 571 (2007) (“The statute says nothing 
about the appropriate sentences within these brackets. . . .”). 
 227. Id. at 571. 
 228. See supra Part I.A.1. 
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Commission should ensure that the Guidelines “reflect the serious 
nature of [white-collar] offenses”229 and should consider whether the 
then-existing sentencing recommendations were “sufficient to deter 
and punish such offenses.”230 This language likely does not rise to the 
level of a true congressional directive.231 In any event, the Act confers 
no congressional endorsement of the Guideline’s emphasis on the loss 
calculation. Even if Sarbanes-Oxley is interpreted as truly directing 
the Commission to ensure severe sentences for white-collar crimes, 
sentencing judges should still be able to reject this recommendation 
due to a policy disagreement with the Guidelines’ emphasis on the 
problematic loss calculation and consider other factors they deem 
more relevant to the seriousness of the crime. 
CONCLUSION 
Early cases indicate that appellate courts are upholding the 
decisions of sentencing judges who, based on policy concerns, apply 
Kimbrough to deviate from the white-collar crime Guidelines. If this 
trend continues, courts could begin to move away from the 
Guidelines’ distracting and destructive emphasis on the loss 
calculation and toward sentences designed to achieve the purposes set 
forth in § 3553(a). 
United States v. Adelson provides an excellent example of this 
phenomenon.232 At sentencing, Judge Rakoff refused to follow the 
Guidelines’ recommendation that Adelson be imprisoned for life,233 
despite the finding that Adelson had caused a loss of between $50 
 
 229. White-Collar Crime Penalty Enhancement Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, tit. IX, 
§ 905(b)(1), 116 Stat. 804, 805. 
 230. Id. § 905(b)(2), 116 Stat. at 805. 
 231. In dicta, Justice Ginsburg’s opinion observes that Congress has in the past directed the 
Sentencing Commission to increase a guideline’s recommended sentencing range with respect to 
Guidelines sentences for serious recidivist offenders. Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 571. Ginsburg 
notes that Congress directed the Commission to promulgate guidelines that yield a “substantial 
term of imprisonment” to such offenders that is “at or near” the statutory maximum. Id. (citing 
28 U.S.C. § 994(h)–(i) (2006)). 
  The language in Sarbanes-Oxley is less forceful. Sarbanes-Oxley instructs the 
commission to “review” the Sentencing Guidelines, and make amendments “as appropriate.” 
White-Collar Crime Penalty Enhancement Act of 2002, § 905(a), 116 Stat. at 805. The ultimate 
question of “whether the guideline offense levels . . . are sufficient” is left squarely to the 
Sentencing Commission to determine. Id. § 905(b)(2), 116 Stat. at 805. 
 232. See United States v. Adelson, 441 F. Supp. 2d 506, 507 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). For a more 
thorough discussion of Adelson, see supra notes 148–56. 
 233. Adelson, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 506. 
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million and $100 million.234 Although Judge Rakoff’s decision was 
based at least in part upon Adelson’s specific circumstances,235 his 
opinion contained strong language deriding the Guidelines’ severity 
and emphasis on factors such as the loss calculation.236 Specifically, 
Rakoff observed that the Guidelines’ recommendation in Adelson’s 
case exposed “the utter travesty of justice that sometimes results from 
the [g]uidelines’ fetish with abstract arithmetic, as well as the harm 
that guideline calculations can visit on human beings if not cabined by 
common sense.”237 
The Second Circuit confirmed the reasonableness of Adelson’s 
sentence.238 The Second Circuit held that in light of Kimbrough, 
Adelson’s sentence is a valid result of Judge Rakoff’s considered 
assessment of the propriety of the Guidelines’ recommendation in 
light of the purposes of sentencing codified in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).239 
In so holding, the Second Circuit acknowledged the potential 
limitations of the Supreme Court’s Kimbrough holding but 
nevertheless upheld Kimbrough’s application to the white-collar 
crime Guidelines.240 
This trend should continue. The Sentencing Guidelines 
pertaining to white-collar crime are deeply flawed. They recommend 
ranges that are generally too high, and are too narrowly focused on 
the loss calculation, an imprecise measure that poorly approximates a 
defendant’s culpability.241 More sentencing courts should therefore 
follow Judge Rakoff’s example, recognize the limitations of the 
Guidelines regime, and use their post-Kimbrough discretion to 
deviate from the Guidelines when necessary to achieve more just 
sentencing outcomes. 
 
 234. See id. at 510 (finding a Guidelines loss calculation in an amount between $50 million 
and $100 million). 
 235. See id. at 513 (considering the fact that Adelson joined the conspiracy only because “he 
feared the effects of exposing what he had belatedly learned was the substantial fraud 
perpetrated by others”). 
 236. See id. at 512–13. 
 237. Id. at 512. 
 238. United States v. Adelson, 301 F. App’x 93, 95 (2d Cir. 2008), aff’g 441 F. Supp. 2d 506 
(S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 239. Id. at 94–95. 
 240. Id. 
 241. See supra Part III. 
